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Abstract
Use of fertilizer and hybrid seed remains low in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. A
possible contributor to low adoption is that farmers are uncertain about the quality
of agricultural inputs available to them. While previous studies have shown that
risk and uncertainty preferences are relevant to the decision to adopt a technology,
existing research assumes that farmers have homogeneous beliefs about the quality
of available inputs. I test this assumption using an incentivized
Becker-DeGroot-Marschack auction in Tanzania and examine how farmer beliefs
about mineral fertilizer quality in local markets influence their willingness-to-pay. I
find that farmers are willing to pay 46% more for fertilizer that was laboratory
tested and found to be pure than for untested fertilizer. Farmers who believe that
more of the fertilizer for sale in their local market is low in quality are willing to
pay a higher premium for laboratory-tested pure quality fertilizer, compared to
untested fertilizer. Yet these results present something of a puzzle, given that three
rounds of testing of fertilizer for sale in regional markets over five years have
demonstrated that the nutrient content of fertilizer for sale in these contexts is
consistently at or near advertised levels. Farmers appear to believe that low-quality
fertilizer is far more prevalent in proximate markets than it actually is. How have
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farmers’ incorrect beliefs persisted in equilibrium? I posit two interconnected
mechanisms. First, misattribution: Yields are stochastic due to weather and other
factors, and when a yield in a particular year is unusually low, farmers misattribute
noise as indicative of low-quality fertilizer. Second, farmers experience both risk
(uncertainty about whether a bag of fertilizer is bad) and ambiguity (uncertainty
about the likelihood a bag of fertilizer is bad), and thus hold multiple priors. I
develop a Bayesian learning model that incorporates both misattribution and
multiple priors and show that in equilibrium beliefs do not converge to the truth.
Supporting the model’s findings, I use farmer survey data from Uganda to establish
that historic precipitation variability relates to farmers’ fertilizer quality belief
distributions. I use the learning model to simulate several policy interventions, and
show that subsidies, information campaigns, and plot-specific fertilizer
recommendations improve beliefs, but do not cause beliefs to fully converge to the
truth. Instead, policy makers should consider programs that address the
misattribution problem.
iii
To my mom and dad
iv
Acknowledgments
Dr. Hope Michelson, you’re the real deal. You’ve been an amazing advisor since even
before day one of my program. Thank you so much for taking a chance on taking
me on as your student. You showed me how to do field work, and your guidance
and patience taught me how to be an economics researcher. I am ever grateful to
your mentorship; any future success I may stumble into will always be a testament
to your investment in me.
I want to extend a warm thank you to Dr. Victor Manyong. This research would
not have been possible without your support and guidance through the field work
process, from study design and survey implementation all the way to applying for a
research permit.
In addition to Dr. Manyong, I want to thank the International Institute for
Tropical Agriculture for awarding me a Graduate Research Fellowship to pursue
this research in Tanzania.
I also want to thank Dr. Alex Winter-Nelson for his feedback and suggestions for
implementing policy recommendations stemming from my work.
In addition to Dr. Winter-Nelson, I want to thank the Office of International
Programs in the College of Agricultural, Consumer, and Environmental Sciences at
v
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for funding my travel and research,
giving me an unforgettable, incomparable experience.
I want to thank Dr. Ben Crost for his in-depth feedback on my research
directions and boundless enthusiasm for brainstorming questions related to
agricultural development.
I want to thank Dr. Jessica Hoel for helping me decide on a research topic and
showing me how to be a star colleague on a project.
I would also like to thank Tess Lallemant for always being willing to help me with
my analysis, especially with navigating tricky precipitation data.
Kelsey, thank you. You have unwaveringly supported and encouraged me. You
are the ballast that has steadied me during times of uncertainty; you are the keel
that has guided me through this entire process, and you are the wind in my sails
that has gotten me through my toughest days.
Finally, thank you to my family for always loving me. I could not have done this
without your constant encouragement. I love you all so much.
vi
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 Setting, Sample, and Experimental Design . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Setting and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Survey Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter 3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 4 Explaining, Modeling, and Simulating Beliefs about
Fertilizer Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 January 2020 Trip Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 Learning Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4 Suggestive Evidence for the Model: Beliefs Correlate with Weather
Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5 Simulating the Learning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter 5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Chapter 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Appendix A Simulating the Evolution of Beliefs over Time . . . . 72
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The use of modern agricultural inputs in Sub-Saharan Africa is extremely important
to increase crop yields, decrease poverty, and improve food security (Wortmann et
al., 2017). Though recommendations based on agronomic and economic evidence
consistently promote fertilizer and hybrid seed use, actual usage rates remain far
below benchmarks for achieving these improvements (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson,
2008; Suri, 2011; Beaman, Karlan, Thuysbaert, & Udry, 2013). Several hypotheses
have been proposed for this chronic under-usage, including lack of knowledge among
farmers about rates of return and proper usage, unavailability, credit constraints,
and intra-household frictions (Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985; Foster & Rosenzweig,
1995, 2010; Jack, 2013).
Several recent studies have explored the possibility that various sorts of
uncertainty influence adoption decisions. If farmers cannot be sure that a given
input will improve their production, they may be less likely to adopt that input.
Some studies have found that risk averse farmers are less likely to adopt new
technologies (Liu, 2012; Liu & Huang, 2013) and others find evidence that
ambiguity aversion is a barrier to adoption (Engle-Warnick, Escobal, & Laszlo,
2007, 2011; Ross, Santos, & Capon, 2012; Barham, Chavas, Fitz, Salas, &
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Schechter, 2014; Elabed & Carter, 2015; Ward & Singh, 2015; Kala, 2019).
Previous work focuses on the role of preferences in the adoption decision by
implicitly or explicitly assuming that farmers hold essentially the same information
sets; in other words, if farmers share certain beliefs about opportunities and risks,
then different individual decisions must reflect different preferences. Nonetheless, in
circumstances where uncertainty is high, these individual decisions are influenced
by both preferences and beliefs (Manski, 2004).
In this paper I examine how farmer beliefs about agricultural input quality impact
their demand for that input. I run a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction
with smallholder farmers in Tanzania to identify how farmer beliefs about mineral
fertilizer quality in nearby markets influence their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for local
mineral fertilizer and for lab-tested, pure quality mineral fertilizer (Becker, Degroot,
& Marschak, 1964). I find that farmers’ beliefs about mineral fertilizer quality in
these markets do not reflect the actual fertilizer quality. Moreover, beliefs have major
effects on farmer demand for fertilizer. I explain the persistence of these incorrect
beliefs using a model of a farmer learning that accounts for (1) the possibility that
a farmer misattributes bad yields to bad fertilizer and (2) the ambiguity a farmer
faces in evaluation of input quality.
My analysis provides a critical step in understanding the problem of low adoption
of modern inputs among smallholder farmers. Having documented that farmers’
beliefs about input quality have large effects on their demand for those inputs, my
study identifies features of agricultural systems that cause incorrect beliefs about
input quality to persist, namely: use of incorrect inputs, misuse of correct inputs,
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and markets and information campaigns advertising unrealistically large effects of
inputs.
My findings contribute to the literature on technology adoption and beliefs in the
context of development. One line of research has shown that farmers do hold
heterogeneous beliefs about agricultural markets and processes (Lybbert, Barrett,
McPeak, & Luseno, 2007; Bellemare, 2009a, 2009b, 2012), and others have shown
that beliefs influence farmers’ agricultural decisions (Hill, 2009; Dillon, 2012; Gine´,
Townsend, & Vickery, 2017; Maertens, 2017). A second area of research has
documented that individuals can hold incorrect beliefs about new products and
agricultural processes in low-income countries. Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, Svensson, and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2020) and Adhvaryu (2014) find that biomedical misconceptions
about malaria in Uganda and misdiagnosis of malaria in Tanzania, respectively, can
inhibit consumer learning about the actual efficacy of antimalarial medicines.
Hanna, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2014) document that experienced
farmers in Indonesia can fail to consider important features of the information they
receive each season about how their input choices affect their yields and therefore
make sub-optimal farming decisions. My paper bridges a gap between development
literature on the origins and persistence of incorrect beliefs and research focused on
how farmer beliefs affect technology adoption. Specifically, I find that farmers are
willing to pay 46% more for lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer over local urea, but that
this premium nearly disappears if a farmer correctly believes that all their local
fertilizer is of good-quality.
I add two important features to models of agricultural learning in low-income
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countries. First, I acknowledge the ambiguity present in the environment in which a
farmer learns by explicitly modeling the farmer updating multiple priors instead of a
single prior. Second, I incorporate how farmers can treat an input as an experience
good when it actually is a credence good, leading to incorrect beliefs about the input’s
quality through misattribution, whereby the farmer infers the quality of the input
by looking at the outcome of an entire agricultural cycle.
A farmer faces ambiguity when the actual probability of uncertain outcomes is
unknown to her. Research on agricultural decision making has found that
ambiguity aversion impedes adoption (Engle-Warnick et al., 2007, 2011; Ross et al.,
2012; Barham et al., 2014; Elabed & Carter, 2015; Ward & Singh, 2015; Bryan,
2019). However, most research on farmer learning in low-income countries has
either ignored ambiguity in sources of information or has made an implicit
assumption that individuals reduce all sources of information to a single prior.
Models based on different learning mechanisms, from learning from others (Besley
& Case, 1994; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Conley & Udry, 2010;
Takahashi, Mano, & Otsuka, 2019) to individual learning (Hanna et al., 2014; Bold,
Kaizzi, Svensson, & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2017; Gars & Ward, 2019), have generally
not taken ambiguity into account. A notable exception is Kala (2019), who
documented Indian farmers exhibiting ambiguity aversion when inferring optimal
planting times from cumulative rainfall they experience. Kala (2019) found that
farmers acted as if monsoon signals were drawn from one of multiple distributions
and made planting decisions according to the worst-case distribution. My research
differs in that I model each of the farmer’s beliefs and I model farmers acting as in
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Epstein and Schneider (2007), performing a likelihood ratio test for each of their
beliefs against their single most likely belief and retaining and updating those
which pass this test.
Belief formation and learning about input quality in a low-income country can be
inhibited by multiple factors. It can be difficult to learn about many agricultural
inputs (for example, improved seeds and fertilizer) because these products are both
credence and experience goods (Darby & Karni, 1973) whose quality can be learned
only through use, but because of their interactions with other inputs and stochasticity
in crop-yield outcomes, their quality and relative importance often must be learned
over a succession of crop cycles. Bold et al. (2017) argues that statistical noise can
make it difficult for farmers in Uganda to learn about the quality of their fertilizer.
Learning can also be inhibited by misunderstanding the data-generating processes
creating informative signals (Adhvaryu, 2014; Hanna et al., 2014; Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist
et al., 2020). Results from my qualitative work with farmers in Tanzania suggest that
farmers are likely to misattribute poor crop yield to low-quality fertilizer when other
factors may be at play. My learning model takes this misattribution into account
when modeling the evolution of a farmer’s beliefs over multiple seasons.
In Chapter 2 I describe smallholder agriculture Morogoro Region, Tanzania,
relevant characteristics of farmers in my sample, and the experimental design. In
Chapter 3 I report farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality, present the results of the
BDM auction, and explore how farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality relate to
their WTP for local, unknown quality urea fertilizer and lab-tested, pure urea
fertilizer. In Chapter 4 I posit an explanation for incorrect farmer perceptions
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about mineral fertilizer quality, model a farmer with multiple prior beliefs who
learns with misattribution about fertilizer quality, and compare the effects of
different policies intended to increase input use by using the learning model to
simulate their effects on the beliefs of a farmer. In Chapter 5 I discuss the findings
of my study in the larger context of agricultural input adoption in low-income
countries, and in Chapter 6 I conclude.
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Chapter 2
Setting, Sample, and Experimental
Design
2.1 Setting and Sample Description
My study takes place in the Morogoro Rural, Kilosa, and Mvomero districts in the
Morogoro Region of Tanzania. Morogoro Region is in the mid-eastern part of the
Tanzanian mainland, about 120 miles west of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s largest
city. Morogoro Region is a large producer of food crops, including maize, paddy
rice, millet, and beans, and cash crops including cotton and tobacco (Agriculture
Sample Census Survey , 2008). The region is marked by low mineral fertilizer use –
only 13% of farmers reported using mineral fertilizer in the 2007-2008 agricultural
growing season (Agriculture Sample Census Survey , 2008). The quality of mineral
fertilizer is good, however: Morogoro Region is where Michelson, Fairbairn, Maertens,
Ellison, and Manyong (2020) tested more than 800 samples of urea and diammonium
phosphate (DAP) fertilizer from agricultural input shops throughout the region in
2015-2016 and found nearly all urea fertilizer samples to be of excellent quality
(only two out of 300 urea samples were out of compliance with industry standards).
Additionally, in advance of my own study I sampled and tested an additional 45 bags
of urea fertilizer and found all met industry standards.
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In June of 2019 I compiled a list of 18 rural villages reachable in one day’s drive
from Morogoro Town, the regional capital. Morogoro Town is a centrally located,
urban city with large markets made up of many shops; there are at least six
different agricultural input shops alone in Morogoro Town. I restricted the sample
to villages around Morogoro Town because I wanted farmers in the study to have
some knowledge about mineral fertilizer. Further, the field manager worked with
local agricultural extension agents to invite twenty maize farmers from each village
to participate in the study. Growing maize in Sub-Saharan Africa is amenable to
mineral fertilizer (Kaizzi et al., 2012; Sime & Aune, 2014; Wortmann et al., 2017),
so maize farmers were likely to have knowledge about fertilizer and its effects on
their crops. I designed the sample so that half of the invited farmers consisted of
women, reflecting the regional proportion of growers (Agriculture Sample Census
Survey , 2008). My sample size is 348 farmers; in seventeen of the villages the
research team interviewed twenty farmers while in one village we were only able to
interview eight farmers.
Table 2.1 describes the demographic and farming characteristics of the farmers in
the sample. Notably, the share of farmers in my sample who used mineral fertilizer
in 2019 is 12%, close to the share reported in the 2007/08 Tanzania National Sample
Census of Agriculture.
The average study participant age was 44 years old, and approximately two-thirds
of the sample reported that he or she was the head of household, with household sizes
of 3.88 people on average. Sampled farmers cultivate approximately three acres on
average; all farmers grew maize, and the other crops were mostly paddy, sunflowers,
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Table 2.1: Demographic and farming summary statistics of the farmers in the study sample
(1)
Mean and Standard Deviation
Age 44.43
(13.09)
Male 0.49
(0.50)
Household head 0.68
(0.47)
Primary education 0.85
(0.36)
Household size 3.88
(2.11)
Acres cultivated in 2019 3.02
(2.06)
Ever purchased fertilizer 0.34
(0.48)
Ever purchased fertilizer in Morogoro 0.15
(0.36)
Used mineral fertilizer in 2019 0.12
(0.32)
Used organic fertilizer in 2019 0.09
(0.28)
Observations 348
vegetables, and peas. Only a third of the sample had ever purchased fertilizer and
only one sixth had bought fertilizer in Morogoro Town previously. Twelve percent of
the sample used mineral fertilizer in 2019, and a tenth used organic (e.g., manure)
fertilizer in 2019.
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2.2 Survey Description
The survey was designed to measure the impacts of farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer
quality on their demand for fertilizers of different perceived qualities. Beliefs about
fertilizer quality were elicited in one module, and demand for fertilizers of different
perceived-quality was elicited through a real-stakes, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) auction whereby the farmer bid for locally bought urea fertilizer, urea
bought in Morogoro Town, and urea bought in Morogoro Town that was lab-tested
(in labs in the United States) and found to be of pure quality. Even though only
34% of the sample had ever used fertilizer, all had heard about fertilizer from
neighbors, extension agents, agro-dealers, and other sources of information, so had
formed some sort of belief about its quality.
Care was taken in the design of the experiment to avoid recency and order effects.
Being asked to provide their beliefs about fertilizer quality could affect a farmer’s
subsequent valuation of the different fertilizers due to recency effect of thinking about
fertilizer quality in their local market or Morogoro Market. In addition, the order in
which the three fertilizers was presented to the farmer could affect their bids through
order effects; an order of locally bought urea fertilizer, then Morogoro Town bought
urea fertilizer, then Morogoro Town bought, lab-tested pure urea fertilizer could
send the implicit message that local fertilizer was the worst quality. A farmer might
think that fertilizer from Morogoro is better than fertilizer from their local market
because they know that Morogoro agro-dealers have higher thoughput than local
agro-dealers so the fertilizer from Morogoro is likely to be newer, and that Morogoro
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agro-dealers might have more incentive and pressure from increased competition to
provide good-quality inputs.To account for these two possible effects on a farmer’s
bids, farmers were randomly assigned to one of four different survey versions, the
four configurations given by changing the order of the two belief elicitation sections
and presenting the fertilizers in the BDM auction in two different orders.
At the start of the survey, trained enumerators informed respondents that they
would be given 4,000 Tanzanian shillings (TSh) (about $1.74) at the beginning of
the survey that was theirs to use however they wanted, 1,000 TSh at the end, and up
to 8,000 TSh more depending on their choices during a game during the survey (a
risk and ambiguity preference elicitation module). The 4,000 TSh at the beginning
of the survey was to ensure all farmers were able to bid during the BDM auction.
Note that the median daily income for most smallholder farmers in Tanzania is less
than 2,000 TSh (Tanzania Agriculture Niche Report: Dedicated Farmers , 2017).
The beginning of the survey recorded information on the farmer’s household
demographics, then a second module elicited information on their farming activity
and use of mineral fertilizer. The survey asked farmers to report their closest
geographic market where mineral fertilizer is usually sold. Farmers were asked to
provide a different market than Morogoro Town if they initially named Morogoro
Town. The reported closest market then was used as the “local market” when
eliciting the farmer’s beliefs about expected returns to using fertilizer and beliefs
about fertilizer quality.
What a farmer is willing to pay for fertilizer is influenced by their subjective beliefs
about the expected returns to fertilizer, so after the module on mineral fertilizer use
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each farmer was asked their subjective beliefs about the yield effects of applying
mineral fertilizers of different types. Specifically, farmers were asked how much dry,
shelled maize one acre of their farm would produce under five different application
scenarios: (1) no fertilizer, (2) 100 kilograms of bad-quality mineral fertilizer, (3)
100 kilograms of best quality mineral fertilizer, (4) 100 kilograms of mineral fertilizer
bought at their local market, and (5) 100 kilograms of Morogoro Town bought mineral
fertilizer. The government recommends 100 kilograms of mineral fertilizer per acre.
Farmers were also asked at what price they could sell this maize to provide an
estimate of their expected return to using fertilizer.
To elicit beliefs about fertilizer quality, the survey presented farmers with the
following scenario and they answered it twice, once for their local market and once
for Morogoro Town: If ten farmers go to that market and each buy a one kilogram
bag of fertilizer, how many farmers would receive a bag of good-quality fertilizer?
Further, the survey then asked farmers how sure they were about the number of
farmers who would get good-quality fertilizer: Completely sure, mostly sure, not
sure, or “I have no idea, I am just guessing.”
Each farmer also participated in a BDM auction to assess their willingness-to-
pay (WTP) for mineral fertilizers with different reported characteristics. In a BDM
auction, the participant provides her highest WTP (bid) for the item. Then a random
price is drawn. If the drawn price is lower than the bid, the participant buys the item
for the randomly drawn price. If the price is higher than the bid, the participant
does not buy the item. Each farmer in the study first participated in a BDM auction
for a block of laundry soap to help learn the rules of the auction. Then they were
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presented with a kilogram each of three different fertilizers: urea fertilizer bought
in a local market, urea fertilizer purchased in Morogoro Town, and urea fertilizer
from a Morogoro Town market that was tested in a lab and assured to be of perfect
quality. All three fertilizers were in actuality the same: they had all been acquired in
Morogoro Town, lab tested and found to be pure urea. The Morogoro Town market
was close to all of the farmers by design and this allowed us to provide partial but
true information to farmers in the auction. The farmers gave their bid for each
fertilizer, then one fertilizer and its corresponding bid was randomly chosen to be
the binding round. After picking the binding fertilizer and bid, the enumerator drew
a price to compare to the farmer’s bid and complete the auction.
The farmers’ beliefs about expected returns to fertilizer, beliefs about fertilizer
quality in their local market and Morogoro Town, and WTP for the three different
fertilizers are presented in the following chapter. Also presented and discussed is the
effect that farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality have on their WTP for the three
different fertilizers.
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Chapter 3
Experimental Results
Farmers in the sample believe there are large yield gains to using good-quality mineral
fertilizer. Table 3.1 shows the average number of kilograms of dried maize farmers
expect that one acre of their land would produce under normal weather conditions
after applying 100 kilograms of different qualities of mineral of fertilizer. I did not
specify the type of fertilizer, just that it was mineral fertilizer. On average, farmers
believe one acre of their farm would produce an additional 910 kilograms of maize
when using local fertilizer than without fertilizer – more than a 100% increase over
using no fertilizer. Farmers believe that using fertilizer from Morogoro Town would
increase this yield by 1,140 kilograms more per acre than without fertilizer, while
the best quality fertilizer would increase their yield by 1,180 kilograms more per acre
than without fertilizer. They believe that using bad-quality fertilizer would decrease
their yields by about 50 kilograms per acre. It should be noted that the expected
yield effects of bad-quality fertilizer are just for a single season; farmers in focus
groups later revealed that using bad-quality fertilizer could “burn” their soil and
reduce its fertility in later seasons.
Taking farmer’s reported price at which they could sell maize into account,
farmers’ expected returns to using fertilizer follow a similar pattern. Table 3.2
14
Table 3.1: Study participants’ expectations about yield effects of using fertilizer. Units are in
kilograms of dried, shelled maize per acre of their farm.
(1)
Yield Expectation
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
No fertilizer 834.15
(424.22)
100 kgs of locally bought fertilizer 1745.73
(741.58)
100 kgs of Morogoro bought fertilizer 1977.93
(731.41)
100 kgs of bad-quality fertilizer 778.36
(563.03
100 kgs of best-quality fertilizer 2012.21
(723.40)
Observations 348
shows the expected increase in maize revenue per kilogram of fertilizer for local
fertilizer, Morogoro Town fertilizer, and the best quality fertilizer. Expected
increases in revenue per kilogram of fertilizer used are higher than the local price of
urea fertilizer, about 1,200 TSh per kilogram.
Farmers, however, believed that purchasing bad-quality fertilizer in their local
market or in Morogoro Town is a real possibility. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution
of these beliefs about fertilizer quality in their local market and in Morogoro Town:
70% of farmers believed that some of their local fertilizer was not good-quality, while
55% of farmers believed that some of the Morogoro fertilizer was not good-quality.
On average, farmers believed that 66% of fertilizer in their local market was good-
quality, while they believed that 84% of fertilizer in Morogoro town was good-quality.
In addition, farmers are not certain about their beliefs about local fertilizer quality.
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Table 3.2: Study participants’ expectations about the returns to using fertilizer compared to using
no fertilizer, calculated using their yield expectations and reported prices at which they can sell
dried, shelled maize. Units are in Tanzanian Shillings per kilogram of fertilizer.
(1)
Expected Return, TSh/kg
Mean and Standard Deviation
Return per kilogram of local fertilizer 4002.04
(2827.56)
Return per kilogram of Morogoro fertilizer 5071.78
(3146.07)
Return per kilogram of best-quality fertilizer 5222.39
(3049.69)
Observations 344
Figure 3.1: Histogram of study participants’ beliefs about the rate of good-quality fertilizer in
their local market and in Morogoro Market. Local fertilizer is in green, while Morogoro fertilizer is
clear. Mean belief are overlayed for both local and Morogoro.
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Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the level of certainty they report in their belief;
28% of farmers report they are completely sure in their beliefs, while 39% report
they are mostly sure, 22% say they are not sure of their beliefs and 11% say they
16
have no idea and are just guessing.
Figure 3.2: Histogram of study participants’ certainty in their beliefs about the rate of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market.
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 s
am
pl
e
0 1 2 3 4
Certainty about beliefs about local fertilizer
How do these beliefs relate to what farmers are willing to pay for fertilizer of
different (presumed) qualities? Table 3.3 shows the average WTP for local urea
fertilizer, urea fertilizer from Morogoro Town, and urea fertilizer from Morogoro
Town that was tested and found to be of perfect quality. The average WTP for
a kilogram of local urea fertilizer was 1,151 TSh and the average WTP for urea
fertilizer from Morogoro Town is not statistically significantly different at 1,199 TSh.
At the time of the study, fertilizer prices in local markets were approximately 1,200
TSh. Farmers were willing to pay 46% more for the lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer
from Morogoro Town; it had an average WTP of 1,686 TSh.
Beliefs about expected yield returns had no relationship what farmers are willing to
pay for fertilizer of different qualities. Using an OLS regression (Wooldridge, 2020),
I estimate the relationship between the increase in yield or increase in returns to
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Table 3.3: Study participants’ willingness-to-pay for locally bought fertilizer, Morogoro Town
bought fertilizer, and lab-tested, pure fertilizer.
(1)
TSh
Mean and Standard Deviation
WTP for local fertilizer 1151.72
(748.10)
WTP for Morogoro Town fertilizer 1199.71
(776.02)
WTP for lab-tested, pure fertilizer 1686.96
(1152.70)
Observations 348
using local, Morogoro Town, and best quality fertilizer and what farmers are willing
to pay for locally purchased urea fertilizer, Morogoro Town fertilizer, and lab-tested,
pure urea fertilizer purchased in Morogoro Town. Table 3.4 shows the results of this
regression; the omitted category is a farmer’s WTP for locally purchased fertilizer.
The “Tested x Best – Local fertilizer” row measures the effect of the expected increase
in yields from using best quality fertilizer over local fertilizer on what a farmer is
additionally willing to pay for the lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer in the third column,
and the corresponding impact of the increase in returns per kilogram in the fourth.
The results indicate that there is little to no correlation between farmers’ WTP for
local fertilizer and their beliefs about its returns, nor between the premium farmers
are willing to pay for Morogoro Town fertilizer or lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer and
their beliefs about the additional returns to using those fertilizers over local fertilizer.
Farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality, however, do have a relationship with what
they are willing to pay for fertilizer of different qualities. I estimate the impact of
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Table 3.4: Relationship between study participants’ WTP for local fertilizer, Morogoro Town
fertilizer, and lab-tested, pure fertilizer with their beliefs about the expected yield increases or
returns to using local fertilizer, Morogoro Town fertilizer, and lab-tested, pure fertilizer.
Dependent variable is WTP
Village FE Diff. in Yields Diff. in Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Morogoro 47.99* -14.93 44.30
(0.05) (0.78) (0.28)
Tested 535.03*** 386.63*** 501.67***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Local - No fertilizer) -0.02 -0.01
(0.76) (0.69)
Morogoro × (Local - No fertilizer) 0.03 -0.00
(0.54) (0.50)
Tested × (Local - No fertilizer) 0.08 -0.00
(0.25) (0.98)
(Morogoro - Local fertilizer) -0.08 -0.00
(0.53) (0.98)
Morogoro × (Morogoro - Local fertilizer) 0.10 0.01
(0.24) (0.55)
Tested × (Morogoro - Local fertilizer) 0.30* 0.04
(0.06) (0.23)
(Best - Local fertilizer) -0.07 -0.02
(0.59) (0.41)
Morogoro × (Best - Local fertilizer) 0.05 0.01
(0.47) (0.53)
Tested × (Best - Local fertilizer) 0.02 -0.01
(0.87) (0.84)
Constant 1,015.24*** 1,069.08*** 1,062.97***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 1,045 1,027 1,024
R2 0.11 0.015 0.012
Note: Omitted category is WTP for local fertilizer. Village fixed effects are included in
all regressions, as are controls for demographic and farming characteristics. Standard
errors are clustered at the farmer level. P-values are shown beneath coefficients. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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farmers’ beliefs about the fraction of good-quality fertilizer in their local market and
Morogoro Town on what they are willing to pay for the three types of fertilizer.
Table 3.5 shows these results. On average, farmers are willing to pay 46% more for
the tested fertilizer than for local fertilizer. Row 3 shows that farmers are willing
to pay 3.6% more for local fertilizer for every 10% increase in their belief about
local fertilizer quality, and Row 5 shows that the same increase in beliefs about local
fertilizer quality makes farmers willing to pay 4.3% less for tested fertilizer. Farmers
with full belief in the quality of local fertilizer have no premium for tested fertilizer.
That farmers’ beliefs about the returns to using fertilizer don’t correlate with their
WTP for fertilizer while their beliefs about fertilizer quality do correlate with their
WTP for fertilizer could be due to at least a few possible reasons. Farmers beliefs
about returns are for using 100 kilograms of fertilizer while they just bid for one
kilogram of fertilizer; many farmers told my enumerators that they were going to
use the fertilizer from the BDM auction on their vegetables, so the disconnect in size
between 100 kilograms and one kilogram and the immediacy of actually using the
one kilogram of fertilizer on their vegetables could be driving the non-correlation and
correlation.
Farmers’ certainty in their beliefs about local fertilizer quality further affect their
WTP for local urea fertilizer and the lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer. Table 3.6
shows the results of regressing WTP on how certain a farmer is about their belief
about local fertilizer quality. Certainty about beliefs are categorical variables, so
there is not one coefficient on “certainty.” The interpretation of the results is that
farmers monotonically decrease their willingness to pay for local urea fertilizer and
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Table 3.5: Correlation between study participants’ WTP for local fertilizer, Morogoro Town
fertilizer, and lab-tested, pure fertilizer and their beliefs about the rate of good-quality fertilizer in
their local market.
Dependent variable:
WTP
(1)
Morogoro -221.96*
(0.08)
Tested 406.63*
(0.07)
Fraction good in local market 366.94**
(0.03)
Morogoro × Fraction good in local market -278.06***
(0.01)
Tested × Fraction good in local market -427.80**
(0.04)
Fraction good in Morogoro -250.05
(0.35)
Morogoro × Fraction good in Morogoro market 540.05***
(0.00)
Tested × Fraction good in Morogoro market 484.57
(0.15)
Constant 999.59***
(0.00)
Observations 1,036
R2 0.14
Note: Omitted category is WTP for local fertilizer. Village fixed effects are included in
all regressions, as are controls for demographic and farming characteristics. Standard
errors are clustered at the farmer level. P-values are shown beneath coefficients. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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monotonically increase their WTP for lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer the less certain
they are in their belief about local fertilizer quality. If a farmer is the least certain
they are willing to pay 34% less for local urea fertilizer and 12% more for lab-tested,
pure urea fertilizer.
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Table 3.6: Correlation between study participants’ WTP for local fertilizer, Morogoro Town
fertilizer, and lab-tested, pure fertilizer and the certainty of their beliefs about the rate of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market.
Dependent variable:
WTP
(1)
Morogoro 48.51
(0.10)
Tested 487.13***
(0.00)
Mostly sure -12.37
(0.90)
Not sure -142.94
(0.25)
No idea -367.15**
(0.02)
Morogoro × Mostly sure 25.38
(0.67)
Morogoro × Not sure -27.18
(0.67)
Morogoro × No idea -44.35
(0.30)
Tested × Mostly sure 22.80
(0.82)
Tested × Not sure 90.20
(0.41)
Tested × No idea 194.55
(0.19)
Constant 1,073.96***
(0.00)
Observations 1,341
R2 0.019
Note: Omitted category is WTP for local fertilizer. Village fixed effects are included in
all regressions, as are controls for demographic and farming characteristics. Standard
errors are clustered at the farmer level. P-values are shown beneath coefficients. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Chapter 4
Explaining, Modeling, and
Simulating Beliefs about Fertilizer
Quality
Results presented in the previous section demonstrate that farmers’ beliefs about
fertilizer quality in their local market and the certainty with which they hold those
beliefs have a strong relationship with the premium that farmers are willing to pay
for lab tested, pure fertilizer. Farmers have a 46% higher willingness to pay for lab-
tested, pure quality urea fertilizer than for local urea fertilizer of unknown quality.
In addition, farmers believe 66% of fertilizer in their local market was good-quality
and 84% of fertilizer in Morogoro Town was good-quality. For every 10% increase
in their belief about the quality of local fertilizer, farmers are willing to pay 3.6%
more for local fertilizer and 4.3% less for tested fertilizer, and farmers are willing to
pay monotonically less for local fertilizer and monotonically more to lab-tested, pure
quality fertilizer the less certain they are in their belief about local fertilizer quality.
The puzzle is that repeated testing has shown that the fertilizer in local
marketplaces is actually of high-quality. Michelson et al. (2020) and Maertens,
Magomba, and Michelson (2020) tested urea fertilizer from every agro-dealer in
Morogoro Region in 2015-16 and a random sub-sample in 2019. Tests of over 800
samples from these testing rounds have found that nearly all had the required
nutrients. Furthermore, more than 300 samples collected from farmers by
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Michelson et al. (2020) tested as high-quality with the required nutrient levels.
Michelson et al. (2020) also tested fertilizer at the port in Dar es Salaam and at the
Yara Tanzania warehouses in Dar es Salaam in 2019 and found that all samples
had the required nutrients. Two recent reports by the International Fertilizer
Development Center also found the prevalence of low-quality fertilizer to be low in
Uganda and Kenya, respectively, and a 2019 report by the International Food
Policy Research Institute found that fertilizer in Uganda was not missing nutrients
(Sanabria, Ariga, Fugice, & Mose, 2018b, 2018a; Ashour, Billings, Gilligan, Jilani,
& Karachiwalla, 2019).
The incorrect belief that farmers have is not that poor quality fertilizer can exist,
but their belief in the rates at which it exists. It is of course possible that poor quality
fertilizer exists in the market and that it is a rare but costly phenomenon for farmers.
Extreme rarity could make it unlikely that testing would catch it. Farmers are aware
of the possibility of poor quality fertilizer existing in their marketplaces and place
a higher probability of it occurring due to lack of experience buying fertilizer in the
marketplace. However, if the rates of poor quality fertilizer are what farmers in the
study believe – 34% in their local marketplaces and 16% in Morogoro Town – then
the testing conducted should have identified some evidence of its presence.
Farmers appear to hold incorrect beliefs about fertilizer quality in their local
marketplace, and those incorrect beliefs have strong effects on the premium that
farmers are willing to pay for lab tested, pure fertilizer. Yet the fertilizer already
available in those local marketplaces is of pure agronomic quality. Persistent,
incorrect beliefs depress farmer’s willingness to pay for the fertilizer in their local
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marketplace.
Economic theory of information suggest that beliefs should converge to the truth
over time. Why are these incorrect beliefs persisting?
4.1 January 2020 Trip Results
Follow-up work conducted in January 2020 was designed to understand and
describe local beliefs about mineral fertilizer using qualitative interviews with
extension agents and agro-dealers, farmer focus groups, and discussions with
stakeholder organizations, government regulators, and businesses relevant to
fertilizer. I ran focus groups in four villages with five smallholder farmers each, two
in the Morogoro Rural district and two in the Kilosa district in Morogoro Region,
districts where I ran the experiments in July 2019. I interviewed the agricultural
extension agent for each village and six agro-dealers in Morogoro Town and the
surrounding area.
The focus groups with farmers centered on:
1. Farmers’ experience with mineral fertilizer,
2. Farmers’ beliefs about the benefits and drawbacks of mineral fertilizer and the
sources of those beliefs,
3. Where, how, and when farmers purchased fertilizer,
4. What farmers believed was good-quality fertilizer and how they ascertained
fertilizer quality before, during, and after purchase, and
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5. What farmers had heard about the quality of fertilizer from different sources
including the media and their neighbors.
In general, farmers reported that good-quality fertilizer was beneficial for crop
production; it would make crops grow “fast and strong,” give “high and good yields,”
and crops with fertilizer would perform better than crops with no fertilizer. Most
farmers said that urea fertilizer was the best fertilizer to use; urea would “solve the
problem of paddy turning yellow” or “high amounts of salt in the soil.” Farmers
heard about these benefits from fellow farmers, extension agents, agro-dealers, and
the fertilizer companies themselves. However, when it came to what the farmers
thought was “good-quality” fertilizer, just one farmer mentioned the chemical content
of the fertilizer. The rest commented on the packaging of the fertilizer, the storage
conditions, or the physical characteristics of the fertilizer. Farmers also told personal
stories about how they knew of farmers who had bought what they referred to as
“fake fertilizer.” Farmers seemed to believe that fertilizer quality is binary; either
the fertilizer is safi kabisa (roughly, “exactly good”) or not. Farmers did not present
viewpoints that fertilizer quality could be on a continuum; it was either good-quality
or it was bad.
The interviews with extension agents and agro-dealers focused on farmers’ beliefs
about fertilizer and buying habits. Extension agents confirmed that farmers thought
that good-quality fertilizer was beneficial. Agro-dealers provided insight into the
simplified process farmers believed about the relationship between fertilizer and crop
yields. Farmers buying fertilizer wanted to be assured that they would get good
results. However, agro-dealers explained that farmers often lacked knowledge about
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why they needed fertilizer. One said the majority of his customers were farmers with
no knowledge about which fertilizer to use; farmers would just come in and ask him
for “fertilizer for planting or growing or topdressing.” Another related how farmers
picked fertilizers based on those used in trial plots ran by fertilizer companies to show
off the effects of new fertilizers, expecting to get the same high yields as the crops in
the trial plot yet unaware the trial plot was an idealized growing environment with
the best quality seeds, pesticides, herbicides, and management.
Conversations with individuals working in non-governmental, business, and
governmental organizations related to fertilizer reported that farmers frequently
complain about poor quality, fake fertilizer. Farmers’ complaints happen after
using fertilizer and seeing bad yield realizations; farmers who use fertilizer and see
a bad yield blame it on the fertilizer because they expected good results from using
fertilizer. An officer at the Tanzania Fertilizer Regulatory Authority described how
tobacco farmers from different regions of Tanzania complained that they had used a
fake blended fertilizer after their plants grew yellow and stunted after applying that
fertilizer. He traveled to the region and tested the fertilizer based on these reports
and test results indicated that the fertilizer in question was pure. Similarly,
training officers at Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (roughly, the
National Network of Farmers’ Groups in Tanzania) provided stories about how
their member farmers complained about fake fertilizer after getting bad yield
results after applying fertilizer. They said how farmers expected to get the high
yields “promised to them” by fertilizer companies and agro-dealers after using
fertilizer, so when they experienced poor yields blamed the fertilizer. Conversations
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with the African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership and the Alliance for a
Green Revolution for Africa provided insight consistent with the experience of
agro-dealers: many smallholder farmers with whom the organizations worked had
little experience with fertilizer and limited understanding of fertilizer’s specific role
in the growing process.
The focus groups, interviews, and meetings provide insight into rural smallholder
farmers’ beliefs about and use of mineral fertilizer in Tanzania. Farmers do not
fully understand the role of fertilizer in crop cultivation and yields and they tend
to think fertilizer is of binary quality: good fertilizer leads to good yield results and
bad fertilizer leads to bad yield results. These insights suggest that farmers also may
think that using fertilizer and then having lower than expected yields implies the
fertilizer was bad.
4.2 Literature
I connect three strands of literature to rationalize and model the persistence of
incorrect beliefs about fertilizer quality. The first explores the effects of asymmetric
information about product quality. The second is on possible reasons for the existence
and persistence of incorrect beliefs. The third is on learning, namely agricultural
learning in low-income countries and models of learning under ambiguity.
Akerlof (1970), Darby and Karni (1973), and Leland (1979) help to define how to
think about fertilizer quality in a low-income country. Akerlof (1970) introduced a
structure for determining the economic costs of fraud, and in doing so outlined the
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type of product in which fraud was possible: the quality of the product is asymmetric,
with the seller knowing more about the product quality than the buyer. In a low-
regulation context such as Tanzania, fertilizer is one such product.
Darby and Karni (1973) took the idea of fraud further and gave more definition
to what it meant for product quality to be amenable to fraud. They defined a
class of “credence” qualities, where the assessment of their value required additional
costly information. The quality of fertilizer is credence, as “credence qualities arise
whenever a good is utilized either in combination with other goods of uncertain
properties to produce measurable output or in a production process in which output,
at least in a subjective sense, is stochastic, or where both occur.” The agricultural
production process is inherently stochastic, and the inputs used with fertilizer – soil
quality and health, herbicides and pesticides, seeds, and weather – all are goods or
environmental conditions with properties uncertain to the farmer. Fertilizer quality is
also an experience quality; a farmer can learn about the quality of fertilizer, but only
after repeated uses. Given that farmers are promised increased yields by fertilizer
companies and agro-dealers if they use fertilizer, it makes sense for a farmer to think
that fertilizer quality is an experience quality when it is in fact more of a credence
quality; therefore, if a farmer thinks fertilizer quality is an experience quality and
sees poor yields after using fertilizer, attributing the poor yields to bad fertilizer is
a rational action.
Leland (1979) provided possible reasons for information asymmetries to persist.
One reason is that eliminating those asymmetries could be more expensive than the
potential welfare gain; in the Tanzanian context the perceived welfare gain could be
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small because fertilizer is already of good-quality. That is not to say there is no
welfare gain to eliminating asymmetries; a welfare gain could come from shifting
farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality and therefore being more willing to use
fertilizer. In addition, because the price of fertilizer is set by the government,
agro-dealers do not have an incentive to prove the quality of their fertilizer.
Another is the difficulty of making sellers liable for poor quality products when it is
difficult or impossible to infer product failure; in the context of fertilizer, it might
be difficult to ascertain the quality of fertilizer from the quality of crops grown due
to the effects of other inputs and inherent stochasticity.
A large number of papers explain the existence and persistence of incorrect
beliefs through the existence of a faulty learning mechanism. Chen, Iyer, and
Pazgal (2010) provide a theoretical analysis of a situation where a consumer is
unable to perfectly recall prices when deciding to purchase due to limited memory.
Instead, they categorize a price – as “cheap,” “less cheap,” and so on to
“expensive” – and then when faced with a new price rely on past experience
associated with the category of the new price to make their purchasing decision.
von Thadden (1992) models a situation in which a seller attempts to find an
optimal price against a consumer who learns about price signals by recalling only
past prices and associated qualities. Spiegler (2006) models how patients reasoning
anecdotally on random, casual stories can lead to the existence of a market of
“quacks,” false doctors whose treatments have no effect on sick patient outcomes,
and Piccione and Rubinstein (2003) model how heterogeneous abilities among
agents to recognize patterns in signals of information can lead to some agents being
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unable to learn fully from the signal. More recently, Koc¸ak (2018) presents how
sequential updating – a situation in which an agent must choose the order in which
to update a prior based on multiple sources of information – leads to different
posterior beliefs. In a similar vein, Schwartzstein (2014) shows how selective
attention – where an agent must choose a priori which signals to attend to – can
lead to the agent having systematically biased forecasts and incorrect beliefs.
Four papers that speak most closely to this research, in that they address the
difficulty of learning about product quality or agricultural practices in a low-income
country, are Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist et al. (2020), Adhvaryu (2014), Hanna et al. (2014),
and Bold et al. (2017). The first two papers examine how consumers form beliefs
about antimalarial medicine in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the former in Uganda and
latter in Tanzania. A key difference between these papers and mine is that in the
case of antimalarial drugs, there actually is a problem with low-quality, fake
medicine in the markets. However, the papers provide insight into my problem. An
earlier version of the first finds that biomedical misconceptions about malaria
hamper the ability to learn about the quality of antimalarial medicine
(Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, Svensson, & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2013). Misconceptions about
malaria cause the consumer to attend to the incorrect data provided by treatment.
This paper supports my idea that farmers’ misconceptions about fertilizer’s
relationship to yields hinder their learning about its quality. The second finds that
misdiagnosis of malaria slows the rate of social learning about the quality of
medicine due to adding noise to information available from therapeutic results. If a
consumer is incorrectly diagnosed with malaria, then attempting to infer
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information from their results with a specific antimalarial medicine will be fruitless
and overall detrimental to learning about the effectiveness of antimalarials.
Increased access to diagnostic technology would help the learning process, argues
Adhvaryu. In my situation, a farmer using the wrong fertilizer given the soil in
their field or what their crop needs or using it incorrectly is akin to misdiagnosis.
Hanna et al. (2014) show how selective attention can cause farmers to continually
have sub-optimal practices; seaweed farmers in their paper don’t consider pod size
to when considering the dimensions along which to learn and subsequently fail to
learn how pod size impacts their seaweed yield. Their paper supports my model, in
that farmers in my model just select crop yields as the only dimension to learn
about the chemical quality of the fertilizer they applied to their field. Bold et al.
(2017) show how the noise in yields make it harder for Ugandan farmers to learn
about fertilizer quality; however, they argue that is the reason why
substandard-quality fertilizer can continue to exist in the market in Uganda. While
my paper also considers farmers learning about fertilizer quality, my argument is
different: ambiguity and farmers’ learning with misattribution causes them to
persistently, incorrectly believe the existence of poor quality fertilizer in their
markets.
Farmers attempting to learn about fertilizer quality face a complicated, vaguely
specified, and poorly understood environment. Agricultural noise obscures the
signals they receive about fertilizer quality. Further, multiple different sources tell
them different things about fertilizer quality: Fertilizer companies and agro-dealers
promote fertilizer’s high quality while fellow farmers, newspaper reports, and some
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farmer advocacy groups warn of poor quality fertilizer (Kasumuni, 2016). Taking
ambiguity into account, farmers in my model have multiple priors about fertilizer
quality instead of a single prior. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) introduced the
concept of multiple priors, Epstein and Schneider (2003) axiomatized a multiple
prior learning process, and Epstein and Schneider (2007) introduced the
decision-making process I use: Given a realization of the data, the farmer performs
a likelihood ratio test for each of their beliefs against their most likely belief and
only keeps and updates those which pass the test. Multiple priors are apt for
farmers learning about fertilizer quality; multiple priors have been applied in
finance (Garlappi, Uppal, & Wang, 2007; Epstein & Schneider, 2008, 2010; Ilut &
Schneider, 2014), and are particularly well suited to model situations where agents
receive ambiguous signals in poorly defined environments (Bland & Rosokha, 2019;
Cubitt, van de Kuilen, & Mukerji, 2020).
4.3 Learning Model
In the model, the farmer thinks that the rate of good-quality fertilizer follows a
Bernoulli(p) distribution - I learned that farmers think that fertilizer is either good-
quality or bad-quality. In period zero, the farmer has a set of active priors P0 =
{pi0(θ1), pi0(θ2), . . . , pi0(θk)} about the value of p and an empty set D0 of discarded,
or inactive, priors. The farmer learns about p by observing the yield realizations
Y1 = {y11, y12, . . . , y1n) of all her n neighbors who use fertilizer. While there are more
than n farmers in the village, the farmers just learns about fertilizer quality from
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the yields of the n farmers who use fertilizer. Every yield realization in each period
follows a linear growing process with mean µ and a “noise” following a N(0, σ2)
distribution. If a yield falls below a certain threshold sl, then the farmer attributes
“bad fertilizer,” or a failure, to that plot; conversely, if the yield is above sh >
sl, the farmer attributes “good fertilizer,” or a success, to that plot. A yield in
between the two thresholds doesn’t provide the farmer with information so is ignored
when updating. The farmer’s inferred fertilizer quality for an informative yield y1i is
denoted as x1i . Given that the farmer thinks that the rate of good-quality fertilizer
follows a Bernoulli(p) distribution, the informative yields X1 = {x11, x12, . . . , x1m}
follows a Binomial(m, p) distribution. Given the data X1, a prior pi0(θ) is updated
to pi1(θ) = pi0(θ | X1) according to Bayes’ Rule:
pi1(θ) = pi0(θ | X1)
=
f(X1 | θ) pi0(θ)
f(X1)
Where
f(X1) =
∫
f(X1 | θ) pi0(θ)dθ
The denominator is to normalize the updated prior; the updated prior is proportional
to f(X1 | θ) pi0(θ) and can be written as
pi1(θ) ∝ f(X1 | θ) pi0(θ)
After observing the yield data and inferred number of plots with good-quality
fertilizer and plots with bad-quality fertilizer, the farmer must make a choice: Which
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priors should they choose to update, and which should they discard? Epstein and
Schneider (2007) provide an intuitive procedure: For each pi0(θj) ∈ P0, the farmer
calculates the likelihood of observing X1, L(X1 | pi0(θj)). The farmer picks the prior
with the highest such likelihood, pi0(θ∗) ≡ argmaxpi0(θ)∈P0 L(X1 |pi0(θ)), and compares
the likelihood of all the others to it. If the ratio of the likelihood of the data given
a prior to the highest likelihood is below a parameter γ, then the prior is discarded
and not updated. The parameter γ governs the extent to which the farmer is willing
to reevaluate a prior based on new data. Essentially, the farmer updates the priors
that pass a likelihood-ratio test with the most likely prior. In other words,
P1 =
{
pi1(θ) | pi0(θ) ∈ P0, L(X
1 | pi0(θ))
L(X1 | pi0(θ∗)) ≥ γ
}
(4.1)
Discarded priors go into a set of discarded priors D1. The likelihood-ratio test is
also performed on discarded priors; if a discarded prior passes the likelihood-ratio
test it gets updated and goes back into the set of active priors. The evolution of the
farmer’s beliefs over time are given by the priors in the set of active priors.
A flexible prior is needed to model the farmer’s beliefs. The farmer thinks that
fertilizer quality is binary, but she knows that she does not know the share of good-
quality fertilizer in the market. The Beta-Binomial(m, p, α, β) distribution allows for
modeling this situation. The random variable of the number of successful informative
trials, call it X, follows a Binomial(m, p) distribution, while the parameter of the
Binomial distribution p follows a Beta(α, β) distribution. The farmer attempts to
learn about p.
36
Dropping indices for brevity,
X ∼ Bin(m, p), p ∼ Beta(α, β)
Which means
P (X = k |m, p) = L(p | k) =
(
m
k
)
pk(1− p)m−k
And
pi(p | α, β) = Beta(α, β) = p
α−1(1− p)β−1
B(α, β)
, p ∈ [0, 1], B(α, β) = Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
Given a number of successes k out of m informative trials, we need to find out how
to update a given prior. The posterior is proportional to the likelihood of seeing the
data multiplied by the prior distribution. Thus, again dropping indices to allow for
cleaner derivations, the posterior pi(p |m, k, α, β) is given by:
pi(p |m, k, α, β) ∝ L(k |m, p)pi(p | α, β)
=
(
m
k
)
pk(1− p)m−k p
α−1(1− p)β−1
B(α, β)
∝ pα+k−1(1− α)β+m−k−1
(4.2)
We see that the updated α parameter is just the prior value plus the number of
successes, and the updated β parameter is just the prior value plus the number of
failures.
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To perform the likelihood ratio test, we need to know the likelihood of seeing k
for given m, α, and β values, p(X = k |m,α, β). This is given by:
p(X = k |m,α, β) =
∫ 1
0
p(X = k |m, p)pi(p | α, β)dp
=
∫ 1
0
(
m
k
)
pk(1− p)m−k p
α−1(1− p)β−1
B(α, β)
dp
=
(
m
k
)
1
B(α, β)
∫ 1
0
pk(1− p)m−kpα−1(1− p)β−1dp
=
(
m
k
)
1
B(α, β)
∫ 1
0
pk+α−1(1− p)m−k+β−1dp
=
(
m
k
)
B(α + k, β +m− k)
B(α, β)
(4.3)
4.4 Suggestive Evidence for the Model: Beliefs
Correlate with Weather Variability
The learning model suggests that historic weather variability might influence a
farmer’s beliefs about input quality. Historic weather variability could make it
harder for a farmer to learn about input quality and therefore cause them to have
an increased variance and range of the distribution of beliefs about the prevalence
of good-quality inputs, and to the extent that historic variability correlates with
weather shocks, could cause the farmer to have worse beliefs about input quality.
To test this possibility, I use baseline data from the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) 2014 Uganda Agricultural Inputs Study and daily
precipitation data from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with
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Station (CHIRPS) dataset (Baseline Evaluation of the Impact of E-verification on
Counterfeit Agricultural Inputs and Technology Adoption in Uganda: Household
Survey , 2015; Funk et al., 2015). The baseline data and precipitation data, while
being from Uganda, can provide suggestive support for my model because of
Uganda’s similar agricultural environment.
The IFPRI study asked farmers what they believed was the number of bags of bad-
quality fertilizer out of ten bags purchased in their local market and further asked
what the farmer thought this distribution was. To make the measures consistent with
my study in Tanzania, I transform the farmers’ distributions to the prevalence of bags
of good-quality fertilizer, not bad-quality. This gives us three outcome variables:
Mean of the belief distribution, variance of the belief distribution, and range of
the belief distribution. I include the range of the belief distribution in addition to
the variance because farmers might not use the whole distribution to treat input
purchasing and usage as a compound lottery but rather make decisions according to
what they believe are the worst and best possible cases they expect. As such, the
range of the distribution is a better measure of ambiguity than the variance of the
distribution. I also include whether or not the farmer reported experiencing a loss
due to drought or flood in the past two years, whether the farmer correctly answered
two questions about fertilizer usage, and controls for the farmer’s age, education,
sex, and literacy.
CHIRPS data have a 0.05-degree spatial resolution, meaning I have daily
precipitation for 5.5km2 cells for the IFPRI farmer locations. Precipitation data
was gathered for the 30 years prior to the survey dates, July, August, and
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September 2014, and transformed into monthly and agricultural season measures of
precipitation and precipitation shocks. The study region has two agricultural
seasons for maize, one from February to May and another from September to
November. As such, the agricultural season from February to May in 2014 is
denoted the ”previous first agricultural season” and the agricultural season from
September to November 2013 is ”previous second agricultural season.”
The broadest measure of the historic rainfall variability is the variance of the daily
rainfall during both agricultural seasons in the previous 30 years. As the first season
is the “long season” it might have more of an effect on the farmer’s beliefs, so I
further split up historic variability into the variance of the daily rainfall in each
agricultural season during the previous 30 years. In addition, precipitation variance
during planting affects yields differently than variance during growing, so I further
split up historic variability into the variance of daily rainfall in each month in each
agricultural season during the previous 30 years.
I regress the mean, variance, and range of the farmers’ believed distributions of
good-quality bags of fertilizer on variance in daily rain during the growing seasons in
the previous 30 years using OLS. An increase in the variance of daily rain during the
growing seasons over the previous 30 years is significantly correlated with a decreased
mean, variance, and range of the farmers’ believed distribution of good-quality bags
of fertilizer. Results are in shown in Table 4.1.
Breaking up by season, most of these effects are driven by variance in the first
agricultural season (Table 4.2). This could be due to the fact that more farmers
use fertilizer during the first agricultural season than the second agricultural season.
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Table 4.1: Correlation between IFPRI study participants’ distribution of their believed rates of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market and their local variance of daily precipitation during
the two growing seasons for the 30 years prior to interview.
Dependent variable:
Mean of Distr. Var. of Distr. Range of Distr.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.554∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.062) (0.003)
Hist. Var. −0.002∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.017) (0.058) (0.016)
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,385
R2 0.019 0.007 0.016
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the market level. P-values are in parentheses
below the coefficients. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.2 shows that an increase in the variance in the second agricultural season is
significantly correlated with an increase in the mean of the believed distribution, but
a regression of the mean on just variance in the second agricultural season shows that
this is not true (Table 4.4). This could be due to the effects of collinearity between
the seasons; an area with higher variance during the first agricultural season is going
to have higher variance during the second agricultural season.
It is important to note that the correlation between historical rainfall variation
and farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality is not a causal relationship; what I find is
a correlation, suggestive evidence that implications of my learning model might hold.
For example, a locale with higher precipitation variance over time might have had less
surplus in yields and experienced less market buildup, which could affect farmers’
beliefs about input quality. However, the fact that a correlation exists suggests
a possible relationship between weather variability and farmers’ beliefs about the
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Table 4.2: Correlation between IFPRI study participants’ distribution of their believed rates of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market and their local variance of daily precipitation during
the first growing season and during the second growing season for the 30 years prior to interview.
Dependent variable:
Mean of Distr. Var. of Distr. Mean of Distr.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.514∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.029) (0.001)
Hist. Var. in Season One −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.005) (0.005)
Hist. Var. in Season Two 0.002∗ −0.0001 −0.001
(0.065) (0.138) (0.318)
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,385
R2 0.025 0.010 0.019
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the market level. P-values are in parentheses
below the coefficients. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.3: Correlation between IFPRI study participants’ distribution of their believed rates of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market and their local variance of daily precipitation during
the first growing season for the 30 years prior to interview.
Dependent variable:
Mean of Distr. Var. of Distr. Range of Distr.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.560∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.061) (0.002)
Hist. Var. in Season One −0.003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.005)
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,385
R2 0.022 0.009 0.018
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the market level. P-values are in parentheses
below the coefficients. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.4: Correlation between IFPRI study participants’ distribution of their believed rates of
good-quality fertilizer in their local market and their local variance of daily precipitation during
the first growing season for the 30 years prior to interview.
Dependent variable:
Mean of Distr. Var. of Distr. Range of Distr.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.484∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.016) (0.0004)
Hist. Var. in Season Two −0.001 0.00002 0.001
(0.630) (0.723) (0.330)
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,385
R2 0.015 0.004 0.013
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the market level. P-values are in parentheses
below the coefficients. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
quality of agricultural inputs.
4.5 Simulating the Learning Process
To compare the effects of different policies intended to increase the use of mineral
fertilizer, I simulated policies using the learning model in Python.
The required inputs that I can alter are the number of farmers, the number of
priors along with their means and variances, the mean of the yield realizations and
the standard deviation of its noise, the threshold below which a farmer considers a
yield a failure, the threshold above which a farmer considers a yield successful, and
the learning parameter γ. I chose to specify the mean and variance of the priors
as opposed to their hyperparameters because the mean and variance are more easily
interpreted than α and β. There are two alternate inputs, the number of time periods
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and a target belief. A simulation with the required inputs and the number of time
period studies how beliefs evolve of the the time periods. A simulation with the
required inputs and a target belief studies how many time periods it takes for the
farmer’s beliefs to reach the target belief. The input variables and their descriptions
are in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Variables that can go into a simulation along with their description.
Input Variable Description
Required
N Number of farmers
Priors Array of priors; dimensions are (number of priors) ×
2 × 1; the first dimension denotes a specific prior, the
second dimension has the expectation of a prior in the
first coordinate and the variance in the second, and the
third dimension records the period
M Mean of the yield realizations
S Standard deviation of the noise in the yield realizations
Low threshold Threshold below which a yield is denoted a failure by
the farmer
High threshold Threshold above which a yield is denoted a success by
the farmer
γ Learning parameter for the likelihood-ratio test
Alternate
T Number of periods
Target belief Target belief for which the mean of the expectation of
the farmer’s active beliefs much be at or above to stop
the simulation and return the number of periods it took
to reach the target belief
If farmers’ beliefs about fertilizer quality are determinants in their decision to
adopt fertilizer, it is important to understand the effects of policies intending to
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increase fertilizer use on farmer’s beliefs. It is also of interest to understand the
effects of multiple priors and misattribution inherent to my model. To do this I
simulate different situations using the learning model.
To calibrate the model, I need an estimate of the number of farmers using inorganic
fertilizer in a village and the mean of the growing process and standard deviation
of the noise in the growing process. I divided the population of each village in the
Morogoro Rural and Kilosa Districts of Morogoro Region by the average household
size in Morogoro Region (4.7) to get an idea of the number of households in each
village (Tanzania Population and Housing Census , 2012). I multiplied that number
by the share of agricultural households in Morogoro Region (0.98) to get the number
of agricultural households in each village, then multiplied that number again by the
share of households using inorganic fertilizer in Morogoro Region (0.13) to get the
number of inorganic fertilizer using households in each village (Agriculture Sample
Census Survey , 2008). I took the median of that number for all villages (52) and set
it as the baseline number of farmers in the model.
I set the mean of the yield realizations and the standard deviation of the noise in
the yield realizations using experimental data from (Bold et al., 2017); the mean is
1.82 dried metric tons of maize per hectare and the standard deviation 0.5278. I also
set the number of periods to 25 (running the simulations with different number of
periods do not substantively change the results).
When I run a simulation, the two statistics of interest at the end of the time
periods are: What does the farmer believe, and what are the range of the farmer’s
beliefs? Given that there can be active multiple priors at a given time, I define
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what a farmer believes as the average of the expectation of the active priors and the
range of the farmer’s beliefs as the range between the two furthest expectations of
the active priors. To put the belief into context, I present it as the distance to the
true parameter. The true parameter governing the proportion of good fertilizer is
one, so this means the statistics are presented on a scale of 0-1, where the smaller
the distance the closer to truth the belief is.
Each time I run a simulation, however, the two statistics of interest vary due to
the stochasticity in the model. When comparing two policies, then, it is not enough
to run a simulation once for each policy. I run the simulation 1000 times for each
situation or policy and compare the distributions of the two statistics of interest. I
ran a simulation of a baseline situation to initialize some effects against which to
compare policies. In the baseline situation the farmer misattributes poor yields to
bad-quality fertilizer and has nine priors about fertilizer quality; the expectations
run from 0.1 to 0.9 and the variance of each is 0.01. To examine the effects of
multiple priors I run a simulation where the farmer has one uniform prior but still
misattributes. To examine the effects of misattribution I run a simulation where the
farmer has the same priors but does not misattribute. The results of each simulation
are presented in Table 4.6.
The policies I studied within my framework are a fertilizer subsidy program, a plot-
specific fertilizer recommendation program, an information campaign telling farmers
that fertilizer quality is good, and an educational program on how fertilizer works in
the growing process. A fertilizer subsidy increases the number of farmers who can use
fertilizer, increasing the number of farmers by (for example) 50% from 52 to 78. An
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Table 4.6: The effects of different policies on a farmer’s beliefs, simulated using the learning model.
Simulation
situation
Effect on
simulation
Mean of
distances
from truth
Variance of
distances
from truth
Mean of ranges
of active
expectations
Variance
of ranges
of active
expectations
Baseline No effect 0.2429 0.0009444 0.064004 0.0025606
Uniform prior One uniform [0, 1]
prior instead of
multiple priors
0.1672 0.0001787 None None
No
misattribution;
“education
program”
Farmer does not
attribute poor
yields to bad
fertilizer, instead
just attributes
good yields to
good fertilizer
0.01295 1.326e-7 0.01968 3.049e-7
Fertilizer
subsidy
Increase number
of farmers using
fertilizer by 50%
to 78 from 52
0.2378 0.0006647 0.04747 0.001565
Information
campaign that
fertilizer is
good quality
Get rid of lowest
four priors;
remaining priors
have expectations
of 0.5, 0.6, 0.6,
0.8, and 0.9
0.2373 0.0005179 0.0504 0.001234
Plot-specific
fertilizer
recommendations
The yield below
which a yield
is attributed to
bad fertilizer
is lowered
(percentile goes
to 0.1 instead of
0.15)
0.1793 0.0008666 0.05497 0.002598
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information campaign could convince farmers that some of their worst initial beliefs
about fertilizer quality are not correct; this is operationalized in the simulation by
removing the four worst priors. A plot-specific fertilizer recommendation program
could give farmers more confidence in the effects of the fertilizers they chose to
use; this is operationalized in a simulation by lowering the threshold below which
a farmer misattributes yields to bad fertilizer. An educational program on how
fertilizer works in the growing process could help farmers understand that fertilizer
is not a silver bullet and that poor yields could be due to weather, pests, or disease;
this is operationalized in a simulation by removing misattribution altogether. Table
4.6 describes how these policies affect parameters in the simulations.
Looking at the simulation results, the baseline situation has a mean distance from
the truth (the rate of good-quality fertilizer is 1) of 0.2429 and a mean range of
expectations of 0.06404; put in context, the farmer on average expects that the rate of
good-quality fertilizer could be between 0.725 and 0.789. Multiple priors exacerbate
the incorrect belief and range of beliefs, as shown by the uniform prior situation.
The expectation of a uniform prior is the same as the average of the expectations of
the multiple priors, yet having one uniform prior reduces the mean distance from the
truth to 0.1672 and eliminates a range of possible beliefs. Misattribution significantly
worsens beliefs; without misattribution the mean distance from the truth is just 0.
01295 with a mean range of expectations of 0.01968. Even with multiple priors, the
farmer expects the rate of good-quality fertilizer to be between 0.977 and 0.997.
The effects of policies are varied. A subsidy does not substantively change what
a farmer believes about the rate of good-quality fertilizer. The mean distance from
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the truth reduces slightly to 0.2378 from 0.2429, and the mean range of expectations
reduces significantly to 0.04747 from 0.064004. A subsidy helps farmers learn about
the quality of fertilizer by increasing the number of farmers using fertilizer, but
without addressing the issue of misattribution farmers learn incorrectly and incorrect
beliefs persist.
An information campaign that fertilizer quality is good does not help substantively
change what a farmer believes about the quality of fertilizer, either. The distance
from the truth remains almost unchanged and the range of expectations also remains
almost unchanged. Again, this illustrates that policies ignoring misattribution will
fail to shift incorrect beliefs.
Plot-specific fertilizer recommendations do address misattribution, albeit
indirectly, and their effects on beliefs are evident. The mean distance from the
truth reduces significantly to 0.1793 from 0.2429, and the range of expectations
remains about the same. The mechanism of misattribution still exists, but the
increased confidence in the effects of fertilizer means it takes a worse yield than
baseline for the farmer to think it was due to bad fertilizer.
The most effective policy is the education program about how fertilizer works
in the growing process, ostensibly correctly treating misattribution. Beliefs in this
scenario almost converge to the truth and have the smallest ranges of possibilities.
This sort of policy should help a farmer correctly infer information about the quality
of fertilizer from yield realization; when a farmer is able to learn correctly their beliefs
converge to the truth and their confidence in their belief is reduced significantly.
Diving deeper, to compare the beliefs of a farmer with and without a subsidy
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program (n = 52, n = 78), I can plot the empirical probability distribution functions
(PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the distance between the
truth and the mean of the expectation of the active beliefs for each scenario. The
empirical PDFs (Figure 4.1) show that the distance from the truth in each scenario
is about the same, but the subsidy more tightly bunches beliefs around the mean.
The empirical CDFs (Figure 4.2) indicate that the distribution of beliefs under the
subsidy just barely lies more to the left than the distribution of beliefs without the
subsidy, indicating that slightly more beliefs lie closer to the truth with the subsidy.
Figure 4.1: Empirical probability distribution function comparing the distance between true
quality and the point to which beliefs evolve to for the baseline simulations and the subsidy
simulations, for 1,000 simulations each.
To compare the range of beliefs of the farmer for each scenario, I also plot the
empirical PDFs and CDFs of the range between the expectation of the worst active
belief and best active belief. There are values of zero in the distances between the
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Figure 4.2: Empirical cumulative distribution function comparing the distance between true
quality and the point to which beliefs evolve to for the baseline simulations and the subsidy
simulations, for 1,000 simulations each.
expectations of active priors in some simulation runs due to there being just one
active prior; that is why there are negative values for the empirically determined
range. The plot of the empirical PDFs (Figure 4.3) show that the distribution of
the range of beliefs is further to the left under the subsidy scenario than without the
subsidy. The plot of the empirical CDFs (Figure 4.4) confirms this; there are smaller
ranges in beliefs when there is a subsidy than when there is not a subsidy. This is
due to there being more farmers from which to learn when there is a subsidy.
Additionally, I altered the simulation to have a target belief instead of the number
of periods as an input, and as the output have the number of periods it takes for the
average of the expectations of farmer’s active beliefs to reach the target belief. For
example, for a farmer who has priors, each with variance 0.01 and with expectations
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Figure 4.3: Empirical probability distribution function comparing the range between the belief
closest to the truth about the rate of good quality fertilizer and the belief furthest from the truth
for the baseline simulations and the subsidy simulations, for 1,000 simulations each.
Figure 4.4: Empirical cumulative distribution function comparing the range between the belief
closest to the truth about the rate of good quality fertilizer and the belief furthest from the truth
for the baseline simulations and the subsidy simulations, for 1,000 simulations each.
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ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, and 10 neighbors, I can find the number of periods it takes
for the average of the expectations of the farmer’s active beliefs to be higher than
0.7, given that it starts at 0.5.
To see if there are nonlinearities in the number of periods it takes to reach different
target beliefs or different marginal values in adding neighbors from which to learn, I
vary target beliefs from 0.7 to 0.8 and run 100 simulations of the number of periods it
takes to reach that target belief for 1 to 50 farmers. For each simulation, the farmer
has the same priors as described in the previous paragraph.
The results of the simulations show that there are nonlinearities in the number of
periods it takes to reach different target beliefs. Figure 4.5 shows that the average
number of periods to reach a target belief increases exponentially as the target belief
increases from 0.7 to 0.8. The marginal value of additional neighbors from which to
learn diminishes greatly past certain points for each target belief, and that certain
point decreases as the target belief increases. It takes more periods to converge to
a target belief of 0.75 when there are 5 neighbors compared to when there are 40
neighbors, but takes roughly the same number of periods to converge to a target
belief of 0.8 when there are 5 neighbors compared to when there are 40 neighbors.
These both lend support to the idea that learning is constrained by the learning
mechanism itself past a point, and that past that point learning is not helped by the
addition of more farmers from which to learn.
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Figure 4.5: For numbers of farmers using fertilizer ranging from 0 to 50, plot of the average
number of periods it takes for a farmer’s beliefs to reach target beliefs ranging from 0.7 to 0.8 over
100 simulations.
54
Chapter 5
Discussion
I find that rural farmers in Tanzania had incorrect beliefs about the quality of
fertilizer in their local markets and that these beliefs have large effects on their
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for local fertilizer and lab-tested, pure urea fertilizer.
Farmers may be trying to avoid bad-quality fertilizer. The training officers at
Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania reported that farmers believe that
bad-quality fertilizer could “burn” their soil and reduce its fertility in future seasons;
some farmers in my focus group reported the same concern. If farmers believe that
the possible agronomic effects of bad-quality fertilizer are harmful, it makes sense
they would have a large WTP for fertilizer of assured-quality. It also makes sense
that increased uncertainty in their beliefs about local fertilizer quality would lead to
a higher WTP for assured-quality fertilizer; the more uncertain a farmer is about
the quality of local fertilizer, the higher they think the possibility of ending up with
poor quality fertilizer locally.
Farmers’ incorrect beliefs and lack of confidence about those beliefs may be
attributable to ambiguity in the learning environment and a misattribution in the
learning process. The learning environment is noisy; stochasticity in the growing
process obscures the signal farmers can receive about fertilizer quality. Noise also
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comes in the form of multiple conflicting sources of information about quality itself.
Newspapers report on possibilities of fake fertilizer, fertilizer companies and
agro-dealers insist their fertilizer is the highest quality, and other farmers provide
anecdotal evidence about what they believe about fertilizer quality. All these
sources of information manifest themselves in the farmer having multiple priors
about fertilizer quality, reducing their confidence in any one belief about fertilizer
quality.
Moreover, misattribution contributes to the persistence of incorrect beliefs:
farmers attribute a poor yield to bad-quality fertilizer as opposed to problems
related to fertilizer type, application, soil quality, or weather shocks. This
misattribution can stem from simplifying the relationship between fertilizer quality
and yields: all else equal, better quality fertilizer means higher yields; however,
having poor quality yields does not mean that the fertilizer was necessarily poor
quality. Poor understanding of the proper fertilizer to use for specific field and soil
conditions and crop, blanket fertilizer recommendations by the government, and
incorrect application (amounts, placement, or timing) of fertilizer further push the
actual relationship between fertilizer quality and yields away from the farmers’
idealized relationship. Misattribution could also be caused by something else; for
example, applying fertilizer could be salient to a farmer, and so easier to blame if
the farmer experiences bad yields.
My experiment with smallholder farmers showed that they are willing to pay a
46% premium for lab-tested, pure fertilizer. However, the learning model and
simulation suggest that a certification or testing policy might be counter effective
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without the tools in place to address misattribution. Certification or testing, in the
framework of the model, might actually serve to increase farmers’ expectations
about the effects of fertilizer. These increased expectations could increase the
prevalence of misattribution if farmers continue to simplify the relationship
between fertilizer and yields while the stochasticity of yields stays the same.
If beliefs that fertilizer is poor quality contribute to farmers’ failing to adopt
fertilizer, then the puzzle of under-adoption of mineral fertilizer in Sub-Saharan
Africa may be less of a mystery. In fact, low use may be rational from the farmer’s
point of view. Misattribution is a reasonable reaction from a farmer when
encountering a poor yield after using fertilizer. For one, farmers are unaware of test
results that show fertilizer in their region is all good-quality. Farmers are also
aware that fertilizer counterfeiting or adulteration is a possibility; there is little
testing by the Tanzania Fertilizer Regulatory Authority and the only assurance
farmers have of the chemical contents of fertilizer they are purchasing is the
fertilizer bag label. Further, given that fertilizer quality is both a credence quality
and experience quality and information on quality is asymmetric in this
environment, farmers know that agro-dealers are aware of the viability of
counterfeiting or adulterating fertilizer. Finally, farmers are told by fertilizer
manufacturers, extension agents, research organizations, and agro-dealers about the
big yield benefits of fertilizer. These big yield benefits are under perfect conditions
with the right applications of the right fertilizers for the soil at the right times and
paired with the best seeds, but farmers do not know that. It then is natural for a
farmer to think: “I was told by a multitude of people that if I used fertilizer my
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yields would increase considerably. I used fertilizer and I got bad yields this year,
going against what I was told. Therefore, the fertilizer must have been fake.”
It is important to acknowledge the ambiguity farmers face when trying to learn
about input quality and the fact that farmers might learn heuristically, allowing
incorrect beliefs to persist over time. As shown in the simulations, policies that fail
to address one or both of ambiguity and heuristic learning will fail to shift farmers’
beliefs to the truth. An education program about how an input or product actually
works allows farmers to not rely on heuristics when learning about the input or
product; further, an education program could potentially be less expensive than a
subsidy program. Efforts should be taken to help reduce noise and ambiguity for
those learning about new products in low-income countries. One possible method to
improve information quality would be for a village farmer group to record, for each
farmer in the village, crops grown on sizes of land, inputs used, farming practices
used, yield information, and information on weather, pest, weed, or labor shocks
experienced by the farmer. This information, if made available to all farmers in the
village, could help to reduce anecdotal information and provide farmers with more
information on the actual relationship between inputs and yields experienced in their
village. A possible method to improve the usefulness of information is to improve
diagnostic tools; like Adhvaryu (2014) showing that correct diagnosis of malaria
made it easier to learn about antimalarial medicine efficacy, my results suggest that
giving farmers plot-specific fertilizer recommendations can make the signals from
their yields more valuable because they will be better reflections of the quality of the
fertilizer and not obfuscated by the null or negative effect of the wrong fertilizer.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This paper presents the results of an incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction
conducted in Morogoro, Tanzania. I find that rural smallholder farmers’ beliefs
about the quality of fertilizer in their local market and the certainty of those beliefs
have large effects on what they were willing to pay for local urea fertilizer and lab-
tested, pure quality urea fertilizer. Farmers who believed that 10 percent more of
the fertilizer in their local market was good-quality are willing to pay 3.67% more
for local urea fertilizer and willing to pay 4.28% less for lab-tested, pure quality urea
fertilizer. On average the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the lab-tested, pure quality
urea fertilizer was 46% higher than local urea fertilizer. This premium disappeared
if a farmer thought all the local fertilizer was good-quality. The less a farmer was
certain in their belief about local fertilizer quality the more they were willing to pay
for lab tested, pure fertilizer; if a farmer did not know and is just guessing about
local fertilizer quality they are willing to pay 12.46% more for the lab-tested, pure
urea fertilizer. That these beliefs had such substantial effects on farmers’ WTP is
concerning because evidence shows that all fertilizer in their region is good-quality.
To understand and rationalize these beliefs, I develop a model in which a farmer
learns about fertilizer quality. The model has two key features: first, the farmer has
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multiple priors and second, the farmer misattributes a poor yield to the fertilizer
being bad-quality. I simulate the model with and without multiple priors and
misattribution to examine the effects of these features on a farmer’s beliefs. I
compare the effects of different policies designed to increase fertilizer use through
simulations. Resolving the ambiguity a farmer faces only moves beliefs 33% closer
to the truth when misattribution is present, while removing misattribution from
learning leads to beliefs converging to the truth even when ambiguity is present.
Policies that address the causes of misattribution (such as an education program)
are more successful in shifting a farmer’s belief than policies that increase the
number of farmers using fertilizer (such as a subsidy) or reduced the number of
priors (such as an information campaign on the high quality of fertilizer available in
local marketplaces). The number of periods it takes to reach target beliefs increases
exponentially as the target belief increases linearly, and the marginal value
additional neighbors from which to learn becomes zero after a certain number of
farmers are reached.
My results provide new insight into methods and policies to identify, explain,
and shift incorrect beliefs. Even so, some limitations should be discussed. Farmers
learn about input quality in a noisy environment and face a multitude of signals,
so incorrect beliefs could be due to more than just misattribution. In addition, my
model makes several simplifications about the learning process that do not reflect
real-world learning. One strong simplification is that the farmer’s only source of
information comes from observing yields; a more realistic situation might also have
farmers hear about input quality from neighbors and extension agents, etc. Another
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simplification is that the farmer is only attentive to the crop yields of farmers who
used fertilizer; a more natural process would have the farmer comparing yields of
farmers who used fertilizer to those who didn’t use fertilizer.
However, my results do demonstrate that misattribution has a strong effect on
farmers forming and maintaining incorrect beliefs about input quality. The
possibility of sub-optimal learning about new products, in my case fertilizer, is
strong in situations where product quality is asymmetric and is more credence than
experience, where signals about quality are noisy and ambiguous, and where
regulation is limited. Policies intending to increase adoption of new products in
these environments, as is the case in many low-income countries, should
acknowledge and address possible barriers to learning about the product, like
misdiagnosis of antimalarial drugs or oversimplification of the benefits and effects of
inorganic fertilizer. Policies including subsidies for or free trials of a good might
only experience short-term adoption in situations where users are unable to learn
the true benefits of or quality of the good.
Based on my results, policy makers should be wary of overselling technology
without frameworks in place to help users understand and use the technology
correctly. Overselling technology increases users’ expected performance of the
technology, which without those frameworks could lead to worse beliefs about the
quality of the technology. Trial plots in a village to demonstrate the effects of a
new fertilizer on the yield of maize are a possible example. There should not just
be a single plot that also has the best quality seed, herbicides, irrigation, and
practices. There should be other plots showing the effect of the new fertilizer on
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different combinations of inputs to show farmers a more realistic representation of
what they can expect if they use the new fertilizer.
Future research could provide stronger evidence for misattribution and the
relationship between incorrect beliefs and input adoption. Extensions to make the
model more realistic could include broadening the learning model into an adoption
decision model, adding a dynamic income and savings component, and modeling
the adoption decision of each village farmer.
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Appendix A
Simulating the Evolution of Beliefs
over Time
For a single simulation, I produce two plots that show the evolution of beliefs over
time. The first plots (Figures A.1 and A.2) show the distance to the truth for the
expectation of each belief over time when there is misattribution and when there is
not misattribution. For the plot when there is misattribution, Figure A.1, a belief
that is active during a period is bold and inactive during a period is a lighter color.
The plot in Figure A.3 helps to show that beliefs that a farmer holds to be inactive
and not consider can become taken once again into consideration if they align well
with observed data; basically, if yields are particularly bad one year, a farmer could
resurrect a belief that inputs are bad-quality. The plot in Figure A.2 shows that
when there is not misattribution beliefs quickly converge to the truth.
The second plot (Figures A.3 and A.4) for a single simulation shows the distance
between the truth and the mean of the expectation of the active beliefs over time
when there is misattribution and when there is no misattribution, respectively;
overlaid on the mean is the range between the expectation of the belief furthest
from the truth and the belief closest to the truth. The plot in Figure A.3 helps
illustrate that even though a farmer might be able to provide a single number
representing their beliefs (i.e., “I think that 80% is good”), what they consider to
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Figure A.1: Plot of the evolution of the distance to the truth of each of a farmer’s beliefs for a
single simulation when there is misattribution. If a belief is active in a certain period it is bold,
while if it is inactive is it faded out.
Figure A.2: Plot of the evolution of the distance to the truth of each of a farmer’s beliefs for a
single simulation when there is no misattribution.
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be possible could encompass much more than that single number. Also illustrated
by this plot is the effect of the inactive priors becoming active due to randomness
in yields and misattribution: the mean gets much worse and the range of possible
beliefs increase considerably. Figure A.4 shows how the range of possible beliefs
decreases monotonically quickly when there is no misattribution.
Figure A.3: Plot of the evolution of the distance to the truth of each of a farmer’s beliefs for a
single simulation when there is misattribution. If a belief is active in a certain period it is bold,
while if it is inactive is it faded out.
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Figure A.4: Plot of the evolution of the distance to the truth of each of a farmer’s beliefs for a
single simulation when there is no misattribution.
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